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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a network approach to lobbying.  We posit that the building blocks of the 
lobbying game are relationships, with lobbyists and legislators benefitting from bonds based on 
familiarity and mutual interest. Using data on contributions from lobbyists to legislators in the 
2006 electoral cycle, we identify key dimensions of this network.  We find that legislators are 
more likely to receive donations from the same lobbyists if they are from the same party (in the 
Senate), state, or committee; if they are both vulnerable in the next election; and the number of 
common donors increases the more agreement there is in the voting record of a pair of 
legislators.     
 
Prepared for presentation at the 2009 Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 
Toronto, Ontario.   
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 Scholars have long been puzzled by the relationships between lobbyists and legislators.  
A recurring goal has been to understand the game of lobbying by explaining why lobbyists 
develop relationships with some legislators and not others.  While it seems possible that 
lobbyists “buy” votes and other policy favors by wooing undecided or indifferent legislators, 
others contend that they purvey information and persuade members of Congress (see for example 
Caldeira and Wright 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hansen 1991; Kingdon 1989; Milbrath 
1963; Wawro 2001).  However, several scholars find that lobbyists tend to concentrate their 
attention on political allies, avoid their ideological adversaries, and infrequently lobby fence-
sitters, suggesting that they are not buying votes or persuading legislators on a case-by-case basis 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Schlozman and Tierney 
1986).  As an explanation for this behavior, Hall and Deardorff posit that lobbyists “subsidize” 
the efforts of members with whom they agree (2006).  This paper complements Hall and 
Deardorff’s model by identifying factors that promote relationships between lobbyists and 
legislators. 
We posit that relationships are the essence of lobbying and analyze networks of 
connections between lobbyists and members of Congress.  We consider lobbyists’ donations to 
be investments in long-term relationships, and legislators value these investments as a means to 
reelection and as a connection with, and potential influence on, other legislators. Specifically, 
this paper analyzes the factors that explain why legislators have lobbyist donors in common, i.e. 
the number of donation ties between members of Congress.  We use data on over 10,000 
donations made by more than 1,200 lobbyists to members of the U.S. House and Senate during 
the 2006 election cycle.  We find that legislators are more likely to receive donations from the 
same lobbyists to the extent they vote together, sit on the same committee, share a party label, 
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represent the same state, or are in close races for reelection.  These results shed light on both the 
relationships between legislators, and on the relationships between lobbyists and legislators.  The 
next section frames this study, followed by a description of our data, results, and discussion. 
II. Lobbyists, Legislators, and Money 
 Although the 1st Amendment guarantees the right to petition, professional lobbyists have 
long been a source of curiosity and concern.  In the extreme, lobbyists and organized interests 
may induce legislators to prioritize the claims of friendly and generous lobbyists over the 
interests of their constituents.  Mansbridge (2003), for example, suggests that some interests may 
receive “surrogate representation” from representatives without a special constituency stake in 
the group’s interest, particularly if the group is able to offer campaign contributions.   
 There are several explanations for why lobbyists and political action committees donate 
to members of Congress, and much research on the effects of campaign contributions from 
organized interests.  One perspective is that lobbyists’ contributions are a means of purchasing 
some good (votes, speeches, etc.) from members of Congress (MCs).  Early studies suggesting 
that donations influences voting patterns (Saltzman 1987; Wilhite and Theilmann 1987; Wilhite 
and Paul 1989) have been questioned by subsequent research (Wawro 2000).  A critical question 
is how lobbyists could make and enforce contracts to “purchase” specific legislative acts, since 
any explicit contract would be illegal and MCs might renege on commitments if contributions 
are made before a key vote (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996).  To avoid this, organized interests 
might make their donations nearly simultaneous to key choices (Stratmann 1998).   
 A similar view is that lobbyists pay for access, not actions (Chin et al, 2000; Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Langbein 1986; Wright 1989).  Legislators’ time is scarce and campaign 
contributions help to make it “worth their while” to meet with lobbyists.  This explanation is 
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consistent with the notion that lobbyists seek to inform or persuade MCs (see Austen-Smith 1996 
for a review) to the extent that the information they provide lacks enough intrinsic value to merit 
access to MCs and their staff.1   
 A puzzle for either view of lobbying and donations is that legislators tend to lobby, and 
donate to, legislators who are their ideological allies while avoiding enemies and undecided MCs 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991; Hansen 1991; Hojnacki and 
Kimball 1998, 1999; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  This is consistent with the claim that 
lobbyists subsidize the legislative efforts of MCs with whom they agree (Hall and Deardorff 
2006).  Lobbyists’ donations can be understood as investments in long term relationships 
(Snyder 1990, 1992).  Lobbyists will tend to value relationships with MCs with whom they agree 
on policy, and make contributions as signals of policy agreement (Hall 2009).  And, it would be 
logical for lobbyists to invest their donations and resources in legislators who are effective and 
powerful legislators (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Esterling 2007; Kroszner and 
Stratmann 2005).   
 We see two opportunities to contribute to this literature in this paper.  First, all previous 
studies of campaign contributions and lobbying strategies have analyzed donations by political 
action committees.  It seems likely that donations made by organizations aligned with specific 
interests are distinct from those made by individual lobbyists—many of whom represent multiple 
interests at a time—in the context of a long-term personal relationship.  We can deepen our 
understanding of the ties between lobbyists and legislators by analyzing the choices lobbyists 
make with their own money.   
                                                 
1 This is a possible solution to the puzzle of why MCs grant meetings with nonprofit groups and think tanks without 
requiring a donation (Berry 1999):  these organizations may provide information with high intrinsic value. 
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 Second, we hope to gain additional insight by studying lobbying as a social network.  The 
focus of extant research has been on the interaction between single lobbyists and individual 
MCs.  This approach focuses attention on the attributes of each lobbyist and MC in a dyad, and 
we can learn a lot from this approach.  However, we expect to gain extra leverage on the 
lobbying game by studying the universe of lobbyists and legislators as a social network.  The 
unit of analysis in a social network is a relationship between actors, and we can study aggregate 
properties of the network (how dense is it?  What is the distribution of ties?) and the position of 
individual actors within the network.  Political scientists have used the methods of social 
network analysis to study the interactions between interest groups (Heaney and Rojas 2007); 
media, politicians, party organizations, and interest groups in extended party networks (Koger, 
Masket, Noel 2009).  
 Our network approach helps us understand how the interaction between a lobbyist and 
legislator can have broader implications.  For example, if two MCs work with a similar set of 
lobbyists, that might increase the ties between the MCs.  Or, as a lobbyist gains in prominence, 
his or her legislative allies may benefit as well. The next section explains how this approach can 
add to our understanding of lobbying and legislating. 
III. The Beltway Network 
 Lobbyists.  We assume that lobbyists and MCs are goal-oriented actors embedded within 
an interdependent network.  For the sake of clarity, we assume that lobbyists seek to maximize 
their income, which is tied to value of their lobbying contracts.  Contracts, in turn, are a function 
of a lobbyist’s capacity to influence policy outcomes on behalf of clients with specific interests 
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(holding price constant).  Lobbyists, of course, do not make policy directly; they must work with 
legislators to influence the Congressional agenda and the content of legislation.2 
 All else equal, every lobbyist would like to be able to influence policy made by every 
legislator, and each legislator would like to be allied with every lobbyist.   In practice, interaction 
between lobbyists and legislators is constrained by limitations on campaign contributions and 
guided by the structure of the U.S. House and Senate.  Both chambers impose strict restrictions 
on gifts from lobbyists, and federal campaign law imposes a dual cap on campaign donations:  
there is a limit ($2,400 per election in the 2010 cycle) on donations from an individual to a given 
candidate, and an overall cap ($115,500 in 2010) on campaign donations to candidates, parties, 
and PACs by any individual.  This means that each lobbyist’s budget for campaign contributions 
is constrained by his or her income and contribution limits, so lobbyists must set priorities as 
they develop ties with legislators. 
 If there was only one lobbyist in Washington D.C., she would undoubtedly devote her 
contribution budget to building relationships with the most powerful party and committee leaders 
in Congress.  However, there are thousands of registered lobbyists, and they cannot all be close 
friends of Congress’s busiest members.  Consequently, lobbyists have an incentive to specialize 
by finding a market niche that matches their backgrounds and talents, and developing 
relationships with MCs to fit that niche.        
 Legislators.  Legislators, in turn, desire to influence public policy and to advance their 
career goals, including extending their career, advancing within the legislative chamber, and 
running for more prestigious offices (Fenno 1973).  Lobbyists can help them with each of these 
goals.  Obviously, lobbyists can promote a MC’s reelection by making a campaign contribution, 
                                                 
2 Obviously, lobbyists also with the White House, executive agencies, and courts to influence policy.  Our empirical 
focus is on the Congress, however. 
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holding a fundraiser, or volunteering for a campaign (e.g. as a D.C.-based fundraiser).  Lobbyists 
can promote a MC’s policy goals by recruiting him or her as the sponsor of a bill, and by 
lobbying other members on behalf of a MC’s legislative initiative.  Third, lobbyists can aid a 
MC’s effort to win a party leadership post or committee chair by donating to a leadership PAC or 
lobbying other members on his or her behalf.  MCs thus have an interest in developing alliances 
with lobbyists. 
 Every legislator receives office space and staff, and has the right to speak on the floor, 
introduce bills, and cosponsor legislation.  Senators also have the privilege of placing a “hold” 
on legislation and nominations to keep them from the floor for a period of time (Koger 
forthcoming).  However, some legislators are better entrepreneurs than others—they are more 
interested in making policy, more nuanced in their study of issues, and better able to build 
coalitions for proposals.  Furthermore, legislators are distinguished by the committee structure of 
each chamber, which assign responsibility over a portfolio of policy issues to subsets of 
legislators.3  The committee system generates some degree of specialization in both chambers, 
but its effect is muted in the Senate by the breadth of senators’ committee portfolios and its 
decentralized floor procedures.  Finally, legislators are differentiated by their party affiliation, 
and by the states which they represent (Matthews and Stimson 1975).   
 While our data below are not longitudinal, we would expect that lobbyists and legislators 
seek to develop long-term relationships.  Trust is necessary for a strong relationship because of 
the politically delicate nature of their collaborations, including implicit contracts and pragmatic 
political calculations; both parties need to know that the other side will be discreet and follow 
                                                 
3 Of course, committee jurisdictions are endogenous (King 1997), possibly overlapping, and can be overridden by a 
variety of tactics in each chamber. 
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through on commitments.  This is especially the case when there are lags between contributions 
and rewards, or between legislative actions and additional contributions.   
 Hypotheses.  We test this framework by analyzing on the number of lobbyists who 
donate to both MCs in a dyad.  That is, for any two members, how many lobbyists-donors do 
they have in common?  This is a conventional measure of the connections between actors in 
social network analysis.  In this study, it provides insight on the dimensions that make some 
legislators especially worthwhile investments to a subset of lobbyists who share their interests or 
value the traits that they have in common. 
 Hypothesis 1: The more shared committee assignments two legislators have, the more 
connected they will be via lobbyists.  
Lobbyists may develop special expertise and personal connections to lobby a specific committee, 
so MCs on the same committee are likely to work with a similar set of lobbyists. 
 Hypothesis 2: Legislators from the same party will be more closely connected via lobbyists.  
Koger and Victor (2009) find that most lobbyists are highly partisan in their personal campaign 
donations—they give almost all their money to Democrats, or all their money to Republicans, 
with few lobbyists allocating equal portions of their budget to legislators of both parties.  
Similarly, we predict that legislators from the same party are more likely to have common donors 
than cross-party dyads. 
 Hypothesis 3:  Legislators from the same state will be more closely connected via lobbyists. 
Classic studies of roll call voting (Kingdon 1989; Matthews and Stimson 1975) find that 
legislators tend to consult with other legislators from their states, and then are likely to vote with 
other members of their state delegation.  Members of the same state may share common 
economic and political interests (e.g. in promoting an industry that is important to the state 
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economy, or protecting a major military base) and, over time, states may develop distinct 
political cultures.  We expect that there may be subsets of lobbyists who specialize in the issues 
particular to a given state and networking with legislators from that state.4 
 Hypothesis 4: Electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to be connected via 
lobbyists than those who are not electorally vulnerable.  
Throughout an election cycle, legislators and their party leaders carefully monitor their reelection 
prospects, identify the most vulnerable incumbents, and funnel additional contributions to their 
campaigns.  Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz (2008) demonstrate that there are “national” 
donors who give to candidates in competitive races across the country, and some of these donors 
reside in the Washington, D.C. area.  Thus we expect to observe that vulnerable legislators will 
receive more lobbyists’ donations in general, which increases the likelihood that they will share 
donors with other legislators.  
 Hypothesis 5: The more frequently two legislator vote the same way, the more likely they 
are to be connected via the same lobbyists.  
This is a simple test for preferences; holding party, state, and committee constant, legislators 
who share similar views may tend to have similar donors.  We are deliberately ambiguous about 
the direction of causality in this case; lobbyists may focus on subsets of legislators who hold 
similar views independent of any lobbying efforts, or legislators who are tied to the same 
lobbyists may be influenced by these lobbyists’ efforts.  
IV. Research Design 
 
To test the proposition that lobbyists are primarily motivated by their desire to create and 
expand their working networks, and that legislators respond in kind, we have collected data on 
                                                 
4 For example, lobbyists often participate in state “societies” that host social events for legislators and staff that 
represent a given state. 
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lobbyists’ individual campaign donations during the 2006 election cycle.5  Network data is 
particularly sensitive to missing observations and sampling error.  We therefore seek to test our 
hypotheses with a complete population of network data.  Our data allow us to identify the 
network of lobbyist donors between members of Congress.  We identified 20,639 donations by 
1,225 lobbyists from January 2005 to December 2006.  These include donations to members of 
Congress, challengers and candidates for open seats, political action committees, and national 
and state party committees.  Donations from lobbyists’ spouses are matched to the lobbyist.  
From this master list of lobbyist donations in the 2006 cycle we reduced the dataset to include 
only aggregated lobbyist donations to incumbent members of Congress, their leadership PACs, 
and the national party campaign committees.  This results in 10,362 observations of lobbyist 
donations to members of Congress or the national party committees.   
We created a 508x508 matrix of all the members of congress and national party 
committees in the data and calculated the number of common lobbyists between each dyadic pair 
of legislators.  Table 1 provides some summary statistics on these data.  Here you can observe 
the great variance that exists in these data.  A given member of congress may receive donations 
from as few as 1 or as many as 220 individual lobbyists (Senator Clinton was the recipient of the 
highest number of donations).  The number of donations in common for any dyad of legislators 
also ranges from 0 to 101.  Of the 128,778 dyads, there are 85,156 dyads with no common 
lobbyists.  The pair with the most common lobbyist donors (101) is Senator Clinton and the 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.  Table 2 shows the top 10 dyads with the most 
common lobbyist-donors. 
[Table 1 goes about here] 
[Table 2 goes about here] 
                                                 
5 Data were acquired from the Center for Responsive Politics. 
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 In our analysis, we conceptualize legislators as existing in a network.  To use the parlance 
of social network analysis, the “nodes” of this network are individual legislators, and the 
“edges,” or connections between the nodes, are the number of common lobbyist donors to any 
two members of congress.  A cursory look at this network reveals a somewhat meaningless 
tangle of so many nodes and edges that one can barely discern the difference between the two.  
In order to provide more context to these network graphs, we have developed a series of 
hypothetical graphs that provide a point of reference for visual examination.  We can use these 
graphs to help determine if expected relationships exist in the data.  Figures 1 and 2 respectively 
present the lobbyist-donor network for the House and Senate.  Blue nodes represent Democrats 
and red nodes represent Republicans.  In each Figure, the graph on the left represent hypothetical 
data, where the edges are the average number of common lobbyists between legislators, while 
the graph on the right represents the actual data.  In Figures 1 and 2 there are so many nodes and 
edges that it is difficult to infer any meaning, but these graphs at least provide a visual 
benchmark of the data. 
[Figure 1 goes about here] 
[Figure 2 goes about here] 
 We engage in two stages of analysis to test our hypotheses.  First, we run a series of 
bivariate t-tests and visually examine partitions of the network to determine if the relationships 
we expect to find in the data are indeed present.  Next, we use a more traditional regression 
approach to model the entire structure of the data and ascertain if, controlling for a set of usual 
covariates, we find expected relationships in the data. 
 The bivariate test of our first hypothesis requires that we examine the number common 
lobbyist-donors between legislators who share committee assignments and those who do not.  In 
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the House, where committees are larger and each legislator sits on up to three committees, 
legislators may share zero, or up to three common committee assignments.  The mean number of 
shared committees between dyads is 0.226.  In the Senate, where members tend to sit on more 
committees than House members do, the range of shared committee assignment is 0 to 4 and the 
mean is 0.719.  Table 3 provides a tabulation of shared committee assignments for each chamber.  
To test the hypothesis that members who share committee assignments will be more likely to 
have common lobbyist donors we examine the number of common lobbyist for dyads that share 
zero committees and those that have at least one committee assignment in common.  The results 
for all t-tests for all four hypotheses are presented in Table 4.  The hypothesis that House 
members who share committee assignment are likely to have common lobbyist-donors is 
supported.  House members who share at least one committee assignment have 1.2 common 
lobbyists on average while those with no common committee assignments have 0.46 common 
donors.  In the Senate, while we have the same expectation as we do for the House, we do not 
find the same result.  Senators with no common committee assignments have more common 
lobbyists (3.7) than senators with at least one common committee (0.8).  This is a somewhat 
surprising result that suggests the network of common lobbyists in the House operates 
differently, or reveals something different, than it does in the Senate.  We will investigate this 
finding further in the multivariable analysis in the next section. 
[Table 3 goes about here] 
[Table 4 goes about here] 
  Our second hypothesis seeks to test the idea that legislators of the same party will be 
more likely to share common lobbyist donors than those of opposite parties.  While 50% of the 
dyads are from the same party, recall that these data are from the 109th Congress where the 
 
 
13 
 
Republicans held a majority in both chambers.  At that time, Republicans held 221 seats in the 
House to Democrats’ 183.  Also, Republicans held 54 seats in the Senate to Democrats’ 40.  A 
simple test of this idea is to look at a t-test of same party dyads versus opposite party dyads for 
the entire network.  If we examine the entire network we find that same-party dyads have an 
average of 1.33 common lobbyist donors while opposite party dyads have 0.35 common lobbyist 
donors (t = -76.97).  Table 4 shows the results broken down for the House and Senate.  In the 
House, same party dyads have 0.84 lobbyist donors in common, while opposite party dyads have 
0.22 common lobbyist donors.  In the Senate the difference is even more pronounced; same party 
dyads have 6.1 lobbyist donors in common, while opposite party dyads have 1.5 lobbyist donors 
in common.  This provides cursory support for hypothesis 2. 
 Hypothesis 3 states that legislators from the same state should share more lobbyist donors 
than those from different states.  Here we examine the entire network and find that legislators 
from the same state have an average of 1.4 lobbyist donors while those from different states have 
0.82 common lobbyist donors.  Overall, in the data 3.4% of dyads are from the same state.  Even 
with this relatively small percent of same-state dyads, we still find that those from the same state 
share more lobbyist donors.  This supports our expectations. 
 Hypothesis 4 states that legislators who are electorally vulnerable should have more 
common lobbyist donors than those who are electorally safe.  In the Senate, we only examine 
senators who were up for reelection in 2006.  By this standard, in dyads where both senators are 
in cycle they share, on average, 13.2 lobbyist donors.  If at least one member of the dyad is not in 
cycle, they will share an average of 0.8 lobbyist donors.  In the House, we consider a legislator to 
be electorally vulnerable if Charlie Cook identified the district as “competitive.”  By this 
standard, if both members of the House dyad are vulnerable, they will tend to share 1.37 lobbyist 
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donors; whereas, if at least one member of the dyad is not vulnerable they will share 0.8 lobbyist 
donors.  This hypothesis lends itself to a visual examination better than the others because we are 
examining a relatively small number of nodes.  Figure 3 shows the 34 legislators in competitive 
districts.  The graph on the left shows edges with a hypothetical, or average, tie strength between 
nodes, and the graph on the right shows the actual tie strength between these 30 most electorally 
vulnerable legislators.  The opacity of edges indicates the strength of the tie.  The right graph 
displays darker connections between nodes than the left graph.  Figure 4 displays the same data 
for the 29 senators who are in cycle.  The left graph, that displays edges with an average number 
of lobbyist donors, shows connections that are lighter in color than the graph on the right.  The 
right graph shows dark connections between senators in cycle, indicating that they tend to share 
many common lobbyist donors. 
Multivariate Analysis 
 While our initial inspection of the data suggests that our predictions are plausible, we 
seek to engage in a careful multivariate analysis that will allow for a simultaneous test of our 
hypotheses.  In choosing a model to fit to our data we want to be particularly sensitive to the 
fundamental problem of social network data—autocorrelation.  This problem arises whenever 
dyads are the unit of observation, but is further complicated with network data.  In a standard 
regression we assume that observations are independent, but when the unit of analysis is a dyad, 
observations on a pair of actors in a network are highly dependent.  Clearly, Rep. Hoyer, for 
example, is member of many dyads in the data and these observations cannot be considered 
independent, for they contain the same actor.  There has been great progress in recent years in 
developing models to address this problem.  The best approach for continuous variables has been 
in the use of mixed models, or hierarchical models.  In these models, one can use a random 
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effects estimator to capture much of the network-based autocorrelation.  We describe our 
application of this approach below.  In addition, our dependent variable is a count variable and in 
order to make accurate inferences with our coefficients, we require a model that accurately 
captures the distribution of the data, since they are clearly not normally distributed.  In our case, 
the dependent variable is a count of the number of common lobbyist donors between any two 
legislators.   
 To develop a model that appropriately accounts for the count-nature of the dependent 
variable and the dependence and unobserved heterogeneity associated with our dyadic social 
network data, we employ a poisson model with a legislator-specific random intercept ζ1j (see 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).  In a typical hierarchical model one conceives of occasions, 
(i), as a level-1 component, and subjects (j), as a level-2 component.  Instead, we conceive of the 
first level “clusters” as legislator-legislator dyads (i), and the unit embedded within the clusters 
as being individual legislators (j).  In our data, each dyad has two legislators (i, j).  Our data 
therefore has just two “clusters” since each dyad includes two legislators. However, each 
legislator is a part of N-1 dyads, where N is the number of legislators.  We are not so concerned 
with modeling legislators as clusters, as is common with a random effect approach; rather, we 
use the random effect estimator to account for the unobserved heterogeneity between 
observations and allow us to make appropriate inferences on coefficients. 
 Our count data has the added complication of being overdispersed (the variance is greater 
than the mean).  We therefore wish to model this overdispersion, which is typically done through 
a negative binomial model.  However, the random-intercept model with a normally distributed 
random intercept does not have a closed-form likelihood.  To solve this problem we take the 
approach described by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 390-1) and induce a closed-form 
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likelihood by specifying a gamma distribution for the exponentiated random intercept.  The 
model we estimate therefore looks like the following: 
ݑ௜௝ ؠ ܧ൫݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݈݋ܾܾݕ݅ݏݐݏ௜௝|ݔ௜௝, ߞଵ௝൯
ൌ ݁ݔ݌൫ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶݒ݋ݐ݅݊݃ ܿ݋݅݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ܿ݁ଶ௜ ൅ ߚଷܿ݋݉݉݅ݐݐ݁݁ ܿ݋݅݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ܿ݁ଷ௜
൅ ߚସݏܽ݉݁ ݌ܽݎݐݕସ௜ ൅ ߚହݏܽ݉݁ ݏݐܽݐ݁ହ௜ ൅ ߚ଺݈݁݁ܿݐ݋ݎ݈݈ܽݕ ݒݑ݈݊݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݁଺௜
൅ ߚ଻݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݀݋݊݋ݎݏ଻௜ ൅ ߞଵ௝ሻ 
where ߞ௜௝|ݔ௜௝~Γሺ1, ߙሻ, so that α corresponds to ݁ݔ݌൫߰ሺଵሻ൯ െ 1.  In this way, we include a level-2 
random intercept (ζ1j) that will account for the dependence between observations, and we employ 
a distributionally appropriate model that accounts for the overdispersion in our count data. 
 We estimate the House model separately from the Senate model.  There are 407 House 
legislators and 95 individual senators in our data.  In the House data there are 85,078 dyads and 
the Senate data has 4,465 dyads.  In the hierarchical setup each dyad is represented twice in the 
analysis so that the unit of analysis is the individual legislator.  This makes the total (possible) N 
for each model 170,156 and 8,930, respectively.6 
 To test hypothesis 5, which states that we expect legislators who vote together more often 
to have more common lobbyist donors, we require a measure of voting coincidence.  We develop 
this measure by gathering data on every vote that every legislator took in the 109th Congress.  
For each dyad, we calculated the percentage of votes on which both legislators in each dyad 
voted together, given that they both voted.  In the House this voting coincidence score ranges 
from 0.157 to 1, with a mean of 0.69.  In the Senate this voting coincidence score ranges from 
0.29 to 0.97, with a mean of 0.649. 
                                                 
6 Some missing cases in the House data brings our N to 161,986. 
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 Additionally, we include a covariate for the total number of lobbyists that lobbied a dyad 
in order to control for the total number of donors to any pair of legislators.  This control variable 
helps to render observations comparable, given that some legislator may have many more 
lobbyist donors than others. 
V. Results 
The results of our House and Senate mixed models are presented in Table 5.  Both 
models (House and Senate) produce robust results with coefficients in the expected directions.  
We have presented the incident rate ratios (IRR) as opposed to beta coefficients, for ease of 
substantive interpretation.  We find that in both chambers the more members vote alike, the more 
common lobbyist donors they share.  In the House, a one unit increase in the rate with which two 
legislators vote the same corresponds to sharing 22 lobbyist-donors, all else being equal.  In the 
Senate the effect is not quite as strong.  In the Senate, a one unit increase in the rate with which 
two senators vote the same corresponds to sharing 6 common lobbyist donors, all else being 
equal.   
In both the House and Senate models we find that overlapping committee service is 
positive and statistically significant (hypothesis 1).  This supports our expectations.  Legislators 
who serve on committees together are more likely to share lobbyist donors than those who do not 
serve on committees together.  In each chamber, a one unit increase in the coincidence of 
committee service leads to sharing an additional lobbyist-donor.  This is indicative of the 
overlapping policy interests of these legislators, which lobbyists also recognize and seek to 
support. 
Regarding hypothesis 2, being in the same party, we find support in the Senate model but 
not in the House model for our expectations.  In the House the coefficient is not statistically 
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significantly different from zero. This is a somewhat surprising result in the rule-laden House 
that has such strong party loyalty.  This result merits further investigation.  In the Senate, we find 
that senators from the same party are likely to have 2 more common lobbyist donors than those 
who are not from the same party. 
Regarding hypothesis 3, we find support in the House model for our expectations, but not 
in the Senate model.  The coefficients for same state in both models are positive, but only in the 
House model is the standard error of the estimate sufficient small to confidently distinguish the 
estimate from zero.  This shows that House members from the same state are likely to share 
lobbyist donors (2.2 donors), but that Senators from the same state are no more likely to share 
lobbyist donors than those from different states.   
Finally, in both chambers we find that legislators who are electorally vulnerable are more 
likely to share lobbyist donors than those who are not at risk.  In the House the 34 legislators 
who sit in competitive seats are more likely to share lobbyist donors than those from safe seats.  
In the Senate, being in cycle renders one more likely to share lobbyist donors than being out of 
cycle.  In both chambers, being electorally vulnerable leads to a dyad sharing an additional 
lobbyist-donor.  These findings support our expectations. 
VI. Conclusion 
We set out to understand the relationships between lobbyists and legislators, particularly 
the dimensions along which actors in the “Beltway Network” cluster and divide.  We have found 
that lobbyists make campaign donations to members of Congress in a systematic manner that 
reveals information about the common interests of legislators.  Legislators who vote the same 
way, share committee assignments, and who are electorally vulnerable will share more individual 
lobbyist campaign donors than legislators who do not have these characteristics.  In the House, 
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we also find that being from the same state makes legislators more likely to share lobbyist-
donors, while in the Senate being from the same party has that effect.   
By using common lobbyist donors as a way to link legislators, we find many expected 
patterns regarding policy areas (committees), party, geography, voting and electoral 
vulnerability.  These expected patterns show that lobbyists make relationships (as revealed 
through their campaign donation behavior) with likeminded legislators, suggesting both a 
bifurcation of the lobbying community and a tendency of homophily between legislators and 
lobbyists. 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics of Donations to Members of Congress 
 Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
# of donors per MC 22 13 27 1 220 
Proportion of all donors 
who gave to an MC 9% 5% 11% .5% 100% 
# of donors per Dyad of 
MCs .8 0 2.3 0 101 
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Table 2  Top Incumbent Recipients, by Number of Common Lobbyist Donors 
Member 1 Member 2 
Number of 
Common Lobbyist 
Donors 
DSCC  Clinton  101  
DSCC  Cantwell  83  
Cantwell  Clinton  76  
DCCC   DSCC  68  
Santorum  Allen  67  
DCCC  Clinton  65  
Conrad  Cantwell  61  
Carper  Cantwell  60  
DSCC  Conrad  60  
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Table 3  Number of Shared Committees for each Dyad 
Number of 
Shared 
Committees 
per Dyad 
House 
Frequency 
House 
Percent 
Senate 
Frequency 
Senate 
Percent 
0 128,086 79.06 4,028 45.11 
1 31,270 19.30 3,570 39.98 
2 2,594 1.6 1,154 12.92 
3 56 0.03 168 1.88 
4 - - 10 0.11 
Total 162,006 100.0 8,930 100.0 
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Hypothesis Description Variable
Mean # 
of 
Common 
Lobbyist 
Donors T Pr(T) Result
HOUSE:  Dyad shares no common 
committee assignments
0.46
HOUSE:  Dyad shares at least one 
common committee assignment
1.20
SENATE:  Dyad shares no common 
committee assignments
3.70
SENATE:  Dyad shares at least one 
common committee assignment
0.80
HOUSE:  Same party dyads 0.84
HOUSE:  Opposite party dyads 0.22
SENATE:  Same party dyads 6.10
SENATE:  Opposite party dyads 1.50
Legislators from same state 1.4
Legislators from different states 0.82
Both Senators in Cycle 13.20
Neither or one Senator in cycle 0.80
Both legislators are in competitive 
districts
1.37
Neither or one legislator in a 
competitive district
0.838
4 Senators  in cycle in 2006 will share more 
common lobbyist donors than those not in 
cycle.
‐110 0.000 supported
4 House members in competative seats will 
share more lobbyist donors than those not 
in competative seats.
‐5.3 0.000 supported
2 Legislators of the same party will share 
lobbyist donors.
‐24.2 0.000 supported
3 Legislators from the same state will share 
more lobbyist donors.
‐15.7 0.000 supported
1 Legislators that share the same committee 
assignments will share more lobbyist 
donors
55.66 0.000 unsupported
2 Legislators of the same party will share 
lobbyist donors.
‐68.7 0.000 supported
Table 4:  T‐Tests for Hypotheses 1‐4
1 Legislators that share the same committee 
assignments will share more lobbyist 
donors
‐58.45 0.000 supported
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Table 5 
 
 
FIXED EFFECTS IRR Pr>|z| IRR Pr>|z|
22.259280 6.358215
(2.85776) (1.3338)
1.311490 1.053011
(0.023387) (0.0269)
1.075230 2.172521
(0.0558802) (0.18936)
2.284830 1.095768
(0.0856034) (0.2065)
1.466812 3.842020
(0.0309803) (0.15299)
1.009795 1.001071
(0.0002013) (0.00016 )
3.829929 1.379640
(0.0444605) (0.03966)
N 161986 8930
Number of Groups 80993 4465
Wald Chi‐squared (6) 9403.75 2637.19
Prof > F 0 0
Log Restricted‐Likelihood ‐110344.31 ‐15589.7
alpha
0.000
Random Intercept Poisson Model, 2006 election cycle
House Senate
Number of Common Donors 0.000
Common Lobbyist 
Donors
Common Lobbyist 
Donors
Committee Service 
Coincidence
0.000 0.043
At least one member of 
Dyad Electorally Vulnerable 0.000 0.000
Voting Coincidence 0.000 0.000
Dyad in Same State 0.000 0.627
Dyad in Same Party 0.163 0.000
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Figure 1  The House Lobbyist-Donor Network 
Hypothetical Data: Average number of donors 
between legislators. 
Actual Data:  The opacity of an edge indicates 
the number of common lobbyist-donors. 
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Figure 2  The Senate Lobbyist-Donor Network 
Hypothetical Data: Average number of donors 
between legislators. 
Actual Data:  The opacity of an edge indicates 
the number of common lobbyist-donors. 
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Figure 3  House Members in Competitive Seats 
 
  
Hypothetical Data: Average number of donors between 
legislators 
 
Actual Data:  Opacity of edges indicates the number of 
common lobbyist donors. 
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Figure 4  Senators in Cycle 
 
Hypothetical Data: Average number of 
donors between legislators 
 
Actual Data:  Opacity of edges indicates 
the number of common lobbyist donors. 
 
 
 
